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command optimum can be decentralised in a market setting using both a PAYG transfer from the 
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cost of bearing children and, hence, stimulates (depresses) fertility. The policy implications are 
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1. Introduction 
 
The debate about the existence of an “interior” optimal population growth rate in the basic two-
period neoclassical overlapping generations (OLG) model with exogenous fertility (Samuelson, 
1958; Diamond, 1965) is long lasting (e.g. Phelps, 1968; Samuelson, 1975; Deardorff, 1976; Jaeger 
and Kuhle, 2009). Although the importance of such a debate in macroeconomics is undoubted, only 
recently Abio (2003), building on a textbook double Cobb-Douglas OLG closed economy with 
endogenous fertility has shown that an interior golden rule of population growth can exist. Hence, 
policies aiming at achieving the optimal rate of population growth in a market setting may be highly 
valuable. 
    The achievement of a golden rule of procreation in a market setting is even more important in 
presence of public pension systems (e.g. PAYG pensions), owing to the external effects that 
children create on society as a whole, as clearly pointed out by Cigno (1993). In fact, if PAYG 
pensions arrangements exist, the higher the number of children, the higher the tax base and, hence, 
the higher expected benefit received by old-aged in the future, i.e. the viability of the PAYG system 
increases along with the number of children. Hence, when an inter-generational transfer from the 
young to the old is provided by the government on a PAYG basis, children imply a positive 
externality in the overall economy, which however is not taken into account by each single 
individual as long as the contribution rate to the PAYG system paid by each member of the current 
working age generation is shared amongst all members of that generation, that is the benefit of 
having children is too small to be internalised by each single agent in the market economy. 
    Therefore, the laissez-faire fertility rate may be different from the golden rule of population 
growth. Hence, the study of policies aiming at eliminating the externalities of children and then 
favouring the achievement of the command optimum in a market setting is high in both the political 
and academic debates. 
 2 
    Moreover, population ageing and below-replacement fertility phenomena currently occurring in 
many developed countries have exacerbated the concerns about offspring externalities and even 
stimulated some recent analyses of welfare implications of public pensions in an endogenous 
fertility setting. For instance, in the basic OLG model, and under the small open economy 
hypothesis, van Groezen et al. (2003) and Fenge and Meier (2005) are positioned. In particular, van 
Groezen et al. (2003) assumed a fixed cost of children and showed that PAYG taxes (subsidies) and 
child allowances (taxes) act as Siamese twins to realise the command optimum,1 while Fenge and 
Meier (2005), building on a model with time cost of children, compared the substitutability between 
the child allowance and the child factor2 (rather then the PAYG tax) as instruments to replicate the 
second best (rather than the first best) allocation at the steady state. 
    In this paper we discuss an alternative way to deal with the external effects of children in the 
same OLG small open economy context used by van Groezen et al. (2003) and Fenge and Meier 
(2005). In particular, we assess the effectiveness of a traditional instrument in the theory of public 
finance, namely the tax-cum-subsidy (subsidy-cum-tax) policy,3 that can be used – together with a 
PAYG inter-generational transfer system – to correct the offspring externalities when fertility is the 
result of a rationale comparison between benefits and costs of children. In particular, different from 
van Groezen et al. (2003) and similarly with Fenge and Meier (2005), we consider an OLG small 
open economy with time cost of children and define: (i) the tax-cum-subsidy (T/S) policy the case 
in which a wage tax is collected and rebated as a lump-sum subsidy within the same working-age 
                                               
1
 Van Groezen and Meijdam (2008) showed that PAYG taxes (subsidies) and child allowances (taxes) act as Siamese 
twins to replicate the steady-state command optimum even in a general equilibrium OLG closed economy with 
endogenous fertility and fixed cost of children. 
2
 They defined the child factor as a parameter which captures the relative importance of the individual number of 
children on PAYG pensions. 
3
 See, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). Gahvari (1993) has analysed a T/S policy in a life-cycle growth model closed 
to international trade. Recently, Fanti and Gori (2007), have analysed the effects of the T/S policy on the steady-state 
second best allocation in an OLG model without PAYG transfers. 
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(child-bearing) generation at a balanced budget, and (ii) the subsidy-cum-tax (S/T) policy the case 
in which a wage subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax. 
    We show that, depending on the mutual relationship between the constant world interest rate and 
the social discount factor, a PAYG transfer from the young (old) to the old (young) and a T/S (S/T) 
policy act as Siamese twins to realise the command optimum in a market setting (see van Groezen 
et al, 2003). This implies that the T/S (S/T) instrument can be used as an alternative to child 
allowances (taxes) to correct offspring externalities in economies where the public PAYG transfers 
exist. This result occurs because a T/S (S/T) policy reduces (increases) the opportunity cost of 
children. 
    Moreover, while Fenge and Meier (2005) abstract form the Pareto efficiency issue, van Groezen 
et al. (2003) find that introducing a child allowance in a PAYG-taxed economy may represent a 
Pareto improvement. In this paper we show that the introduction of a T/S (S/T) policy in an 
economy with PAYG pensions (transfers from the old to the young) may also represent a Pareto 
improvement. 
    This paper contributes to the OLG economic literature with public PAYG pensions and 
endogenous population by evaluating the conditions under which a tax-cum-subsidy policy can be 
used as an alternative instrument for optimality purposes. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we build on the decentralised 
economy. In Section 3 we show that the command optimum can be achieved by a government who 
has at its disposal both a PAYG transfer from the young (old) to the old (young) and a T/S (S/T) 
instrument in a market setting. In Section 4 we discuss the welfare implications of the T/S (S/T) 
policy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The market economy 
 
2.1. Firms 
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Consider a small open economy with perfect capital mobility that faces an exogenously given 
(constant) interest rate r . Production takes place according to a standard neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale technology ( )tt hkf , , where tk  and th  represent the per capita stock of capital and 
the units of time supplied by each member of the working-age generation on the labour market, 
respectively. Since capital is perfectly mobile, both the capital-labour ratio and the wage rate w  are 
fixed and constant. 
 
2.2. Government 
 
In every period the government runs separately (i) a balanced PAYG pension budget (i.e. current 
pensions are paid out on the basis of current contributions) to redistribute across generations, and 
(ii) a T/S policy to redistribute within the working age generation. It is worth noting that for the 
sake of notational convenience we build the model with PAYG pensions and T/S policy, rather than 
the opposite PAYG transfer from old to the young and a S/T policy. The cases PAYG pensions (tax 
on the old) and T/S (S/T) will be specified when necessary. 
    The government pension budget at t  (in per worker terms) reads as: 
 1−= tt np η , (1) 
where 0>tp  is the pension, w<< η0  is the fixed contribution rate, and 1−tn  represents the 
average rate of fertility in the whole economy at time 1−t .4 
    The per worker T/S formula at t , instead, reads as: 
 tt hwστ = , (2) 
where 0>tτ  is a lump-sum subsidy, 10 << σ  a fixed wage tax and w  the unitary wage income 
earned workers.5 
                                               
4
 Note that a PAYG subsidy is defined as 0<η , while a S/T scheme as 0<σ . 
 5 
 
2.3. Individuals 
 
We assume a three-period OLG economy populated by identical individuals. Life is divided into 
childhood, young-adulthood (working period) and old-age (retirement period). As a child each 
individual does not make economic decisions. Adult individuals belonging to generation t  ( tN ) 
have a homothetic and separable lifetime utility function ( tU ) defined over tc ,1 , 1,2 +tc  and tn , i.e. 
young-aged and old-aged consumptions and the number of children (see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin, 
1985; Galor and Weil, 1996). 
    Young-adult individuals are endowed with one unit of time. Child rearing activities require a 
time cost 10 << q  per child, with q  being the exogenous fraction of the time endowment that must 
be spent raising a child. Therefore, as an adult, each young devotes a fraction tt qnh −= 1  of time to 
work on the labour market with tnq  being the share of time spent raising children.
6
 
    When old individuals are retired and live on the basis of (i) the amount of resources saved when 
young-adult ( ts ) plus the accrued interest at the constant world interest rate r , and (ii) the public 
provided pension benefit ( 1+tp ). 
    The representative individual entering the working period at time t  faces the following problem: 
 { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tttttttncc nccnccUttt lnlnln,,max 1,2,11,2,1,, 1,2,1 γβ ++= +++ , (P) 
subject to 
 
( )( )
( ) 11,2
,1
1
11
++ ++=
−+−−=+
ttt
tttt
psrc
nqwsc ητσ
,  
                                                                                                                                                            
5
 Individuals do not take Eqs. (1) and (2) into account when deciding on the number of children and on material 
consumption over the life cycle. 
6
 The condition 01 >− tqn  implies qnt /1< , i.e., the higher the time spent raising a child, the lower the number of 
children. 
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where 10 << β  is the individual subjective discount factor and 0>γ  the taste for children. 
    The first order conditions for an interior solution are: 
 r
c
c
t
t +=⋅+ 11
,1
1,2
β , (3) 
 ( )σγ −=⋅ 1,1 wq
n
c
t
t
. (4) 
Eq. (3) equates the marginal rate of substitution between young-adult and old-age consumption to 
the constant world interest rate, whereas Eq. (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between 
material consumption when young and the number of children to the marginal cost of raising an 
additional child. Notice that the wage tax σ  acts as a child allowance by reducing the cost of 
children. 
    Combining Eqs. (1)-(4) with the lifetime budget constraint gives the demand for children and the 
working period consumption function, that is: 
 
( )
( )( )[ ]
r
wq
w
n
+
−+−+
−
=
1
11
*
ηγγσβ
ηγ
, (5) 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )[ ]
r
wq
wqw
c
+
−+−+
−−
=
1
11
1*
1 ηγγσβ
ση
. (6) 
From Eq. (5) the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 1. A T/S policy always stimulates individual fertility. 
 
Proof. The proof uses the following derivative: 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )[ ]{ } 0111
11
2
2*
>
−+−++
++−
=∂
∂
ηγγσβ
βηγ
σ rwq
wqrwn
, (6.1) 
for any 10 << σ . Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 1 show that when a time cost of children is considered the introduction of a T/S policy, 
through wage taxation, reduces the opportunity cost (i.e., the net wage) of losing an additional unit 
of time spent working to care about children and, hence, stimulates individual fertility by reducing 
the labour supply. From Eq. (6.1), the opposite result that a S/T policy is always fertility-reducing 
can easily be derived since, through wage subsidisation, the opportunity cost of losing an additional 
unit of time spent working is augmented in that case, i.e. the S/T policy increases the labour supply. 
    In the next section we derive the first best outcome and analyse how the government can use the 
intra- and inter-generational instruments discussed above to realise the command optimum in a 
market setting. 
 
3. The first best solution 
 
Following van Groezen et al. (2003), we assume that the social planner maximises the discounted 
flow of individual lifetime utilities over an infinite horizon 
 
( )+∞
=
+
−
⋅=
ti
iii
ti
t nccUW ,, 1,2,1δ , (PP) 
subject to the economy’s resource constraint7 
 ( ) ( ) iiii
i
i
ii drdnkn
n
c
chkf ++−++= +
−
1, 1
1
,2
,1 ,  
where d  is the amount of per capita foreign debt, 10 << δ  is the social discount factor and 
ti nqh −= 1 . 
    Maximisation of (PP) gives the first order conditions for the command optimum: 
 
( )
tt
t
n
r
c
c +
=
+ 1
,1
1,1 δ
, (7) 
                                               
7
 We assume that capital totally depreciates at the end of each period. 
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 r
c
c
t
t +=⋅+ 11
,1
1,2
β , (8) 
 ( ) 1,1 +−+=+⋅ t
t
t dkwq
n
c βγ . (9) 
Comparison of Eqs. (4) and (9) makes clear the reason why the privately chosen number of children 
may differ from golden rule of population growth: the planner takes into account both the inter-
generational transfer effect (the marginal benefit) and the capital dilution effect (the marginal cost) 
of raising children, which, instead, are not taken into account by individuals. The former effect is 
captured by the subjective discount factor β  in Eq. (9): it implies that the number of children in the 
market economy may be too low as compared with the social optimum. The latter effect describes 
how fertility affects savings: it is measured by the term dk −  in Eq. (9) and implies that individuals 
in a market economy may decide to have a too high number of children. Only when these two 
opposite forces both exactly cancel out the individual demand for children is optimal. 
    Exploiting Eqs. (7)-(9) and the economy’s resource constraint at the steady-state, we get the 
optimal amount of per capita foreign debt, that is: 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) βδδβγ
βγ
βδδβγ
βγδβδ
−−−+
+
⋅
+
+





−−−+
+++
⋅−=
111
**
r
w
wqkd . (10) 
Combining Eqs. (9) and (10), and using Eq. (7) at the steady-state, we obtain the golden rule of 
population growth and the optimal amount of young-adult consumption, respectively: 
 ( )rn += 1** δ , (11) 
 
( )[ ]
( ) γγβδ
δ
−++
+−
=
1
11**
1
rqw
c . (12) 
From Eq. (12) it can readily be seen 0**1 >c  if 
 
• Case (a): rr <  and 1<< δδ  
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• Case (b): rr >  and δδ <<0 , 
 
where ( ) qqr /1: −=  and ( )γβγδ ++= 1/: . Moreover, using Eq. (11), the condition qn /1<  
implies that ( )rq +=< 1/1:ˆδδ  must hold to ensure the existence of a positive supply of labour, i.e. 
0>h . 
    Let 
 δδδ ⋅= ˆ: , (13) 
 ( ) 1: 1 −⋅= −δqr , (14) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) 11:ˆ 2 −⋅+= δrr , (15) 
be a threshold value of the social discount factor and two threshold values of the constant world 
interest rate, respectively, where rrr <<ˆ  always holds. Moreover, δδ <ˆ  ( δδ >ˆ ) for any rr >  
( rr < ). Then the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 2. Let Case (a) {Case (b)} hold. Then 1ˆ >δ  and δδ >  { 1ˆ <δ  and δδ < }. Therefore, 
for any rr <  { rrr <<  [ rr > ]} the command optimum can be decentralised by a government in a 
market economy: 
 
    (1) without intervention if δδ = ; 
 
    (2) using both a PAYG tax (tax on the old) ( ) 0>= δηη GR  ( 0< ) to redistribute across 
generations, and a T/S (S/T) policy ( ) 0>= δσσ GR  ( 0< ) to redistribute within the working-age 
generation, if 1<< δδ  ( δδδ << ) {if δδ <<0  ( δδδ << ) [ δδ <<0  ( δδδ ˆ<< )]}, where 
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 ( ) ( )( )[ ]( ) w
rqw
GR <
−++
−+++
=
γγβδ
γγβδδη
1
11
: , (16) 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ] 111
11
: <
−+++
−+++
=
γγβδ
γγβδδσ
rq
rq
GR . (17) 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 
Given the parametric structure as regards preferences ( β , γ ) and the child-bearing technology ( q ), 
and depending on the mutual relationship between the social discount factor (δ ) and the world 
interest rate ( r ), Proposition 2 reveals that the first best outcome can be realised by a government in 
a market setting using appropriately both an instrument to redistribute across generations, i.e. a 
PAYG tax (tax on the old) and a T/S (S/T) policy to redistribute within the working age generation. 
In particular, if the interest rate is relatively low, rr < , Case (a), then when lifetime utilities are 
discounted at too high (low) a rate by the planner, i.e., δδ >  ( δδ < ), the command optimum is 
achieved with both a PAYG tax (tax on the old) to transfer resources from the young (old) to the old 
(young) and a T/S (S/T) system to promote (disincentive) fertility, since in that case the individual 
demand for children is too low (high) as compared with the golden rule of population growth, i.e., 
the inter-generational transfer effect dominates (is dominated by) the capital dilution effect. By 
contrast, if the interest rate is relatively high, rr > , Case (b), then, different from Case (a) the 
government must use a PAYG tax (tax on the old) together with a T/S (S/T) policy to incentive 
(disincentive) fertility when the social discount factor is sufficiently low (high), i.e., δδ <  ( δδ > ). 
In the special case δδ = , the market solution automatically coincides with the first best and no 
government intervention is required. In other words, the recommended policy is symmetrical 
depending on the mutual relationship between the social discount factor and the interest rate. 
    We note that if social discount factor is relatively high, i.e., δδ > , then only in Case (a): rr <  
and 1<< δδ , a T/S policy should be used together with a PAYG tax to redistribute from the young 
 11 
to the old to realise the fist best, while in the opposite Case (b): rr >  and δδ <<0 , the condition 
δδ >  implies that the government should adopt a S/T policy along with a PAYG tax on the old. 
    Therefore, when fertility is an endogenous economic variable and child bearing activities are 
time-consuming, a PAYG tax (tax on the old) and a T/S (S/T) policy act like Siamese twins. 
 
3.1. The special case 1=δ  
 
    In the case 1=δ , i.e. the social planner treats all generations symmetrically, the first best 
outcome at the steady-state can be realised in a market setting by means exclusively of an intra-
generational T/S (S/T) policy as long as the world interest rate is high (low) enough, i.e., rrr <<ˆ  
( rr ˆ< ), while it is realised with no government intervention if and only if rr ˆ= , irrespective of 
whether a PAYG pension system is in place or not. When rr ˆ≠ , a too high (low) interest rate 
implies that the number of children in a market economy is too low (high) as compared with the 
golden rule of population growth. Therefore, fertility may be stimulated (discouraged) – and thus 
the command optimum may be replicated – simply by making the time-child-rearing activities less 
(more) costly with an appropriate use of the T/S (S/T) instrument. 
 
Proposition 3. Let rr <  and 1=δ  hold. Then the command optimum can be decentralised by a 
government in a market setting: 
 
    (1) without intervention if rr ˆ= ; 
 
    (2) by means exclusively of a T/S (S/T) policy ( ) 01 >= GRσσ  ( 0< ) if rrr <<ˆ  ( rr ˆ< ), for any 
w<<∞− η . 
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Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
    In the next section we look at the welfare effects of the T/S policy, i.e. a wage tax rebated as a 
lump-sum subsidy when the government redistribute across generations through a PAYG system. 
 
4 Welfare effects of the T/S policy 
 
In almost all industrialised countries retired people’s consumption plans are based essentially on the 
generosity of the social security system, which has been characterised in the last decades – 
especially in Anglo-Saxon countries – on unfunded PAYG pension schemes. Our objective in this 
section is to assess the welfare properties of the T/S (S/T) policy when the government redistribute 
across generations through a PAYG system. 
    We will show that in a PAYG-taxed economy introducing a T/S policy can represent a Pareto 
improvement. 
 
Proposition 4. Let ( 0≤η ) w<< η0  hold. Then introducing a T/S policy (is always Pareto-
worsening) σσ ˆ0 <<  is Pareto-improving and 
 ( )rwq +== 1:
* ησσ , (18) 
is Pareto efficient. 
 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Therefore, if a PAYG inter-generational transfer is absent ( 0=η ) a T/S policy is always Pareto-
worsening because it will actually promote fertility while reducing monotonically consumption over 
the life cycle. By contrast, in a PAYG-taxed economy, a wage tax σσ ˆ0 <<  rebated as a lump-sum 
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subsidy within the same working-age (child-bearing) generation makes all individuals better off and 
thus implies a Pareto improvement as compared with the case in the absence of such a policy. 
Moreover, a T/S policy *σσ =  is Pareto efficient, because it is not possible to make the current as 
well as all subsequent generations better off by either increasing or decreasing the wage tax σ . In 
particular, the optimal T/S policy is obtained as the present value of the PAYG tax divided by the 
cost of raising a child. 
    The following figure clearly depicts in a stylised way the welfare gains obtained by all 
generations when the government introduces a T/S policy in a PAYG-taxed economy. The solid 
line refers to the welfare level in an economy with PAYG pensions and T/S policy, the dashed line 
to the laissez faire economy. Introducing a T/S policy in the range σσ ˆ0 <<  represents a Pareto 
improvement, while *σ  corresponds to the Pareto efficient allocation. 
 
 
Figure 1. The lifetime welfare as a function of σ  in a PAYG-taxed economy (i.e., w<< η0 ). 
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    Finally, we note that the introduction of a S/T policy σσ ˆˆ0 <<  represents a Pareto improvement 
with *σσ =  being Pareto efficient for any 0<η , i.e. the indirect lifetime utility index of all 
generations can be maximised even with the S/T instrument when a PAYG transfer from the old to 
the young is realised. However, this appears as a less realistic case. For this reason and for economy 
of space, we abstract from a formal and graphical analyses of the S/T policy.8 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Using an overlapping generations small open economy with endogenous fertility and time cost of 
children, we show that the government can let the market solution coincide with the command 
optimum using both a PAYG tax (tax on the old) to redistribute across generations and tax-cum-
subsidy (subsidy-cum-tax) policy: if the government redistribute across generations through a 
PAYG tax (tax on the old), and child rearing activities are time consuming, a T/S (S/T) policy, 
through a reduction (increase) in the net wage earned by the members of the working age 
generation, reduces (increases) the opportunity cost of losing an additional working unit of time to 
take care of children, and, hence, acts as a fertility-enhancing (fertility-reducing) device allowing to 
eliminate the external effects of children on society as a whole. Moreover, in a PAYG-taxed 
(subsidised) economy a T/S (S/T) scheme can be Pareto efficient. 
    The policy implications are straightforward: when individuals take into account the effects of 
child rearing activities on their labour supply decisions a government can avoid to implement a 
child allowance (tax) system to internalise offspring externalities: it is sufficient to use a traditional 
instrument in the theory of public finance, namely the T/S (S/T) policy. 
 
Appendix A 
                                               
8
 The proof is available on request. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
    Let δδ =  hold. Substituting out 0== ησ  into Eqs. (5) and (6) gives *** nn = , **1*1 cc =  for any 
r . 
 
    Let δδ ≠  hold. Combining (5) with (11) and (6) with (12) and solving for σ  and η  gives 
 ( )ησσ = , (A1) 
 ( )σηη = , (A2) 
respectively. From Eqs. (A1) and (A2) we get ( )δηGR  and ( )δσGR , see Eqs. (16) and (17) in the 
main text. 
If rr <  and 1<< δδ  { rr >  and δδ <<0 }, then ( ) wGR << δη0  ( 0< ) and ( ) 10 << δσGR  ( 0< ) 
if and only if 1<< δδ  ( δδδ << ) { δδ <<0  ( δδδ << ) [ δδ <<0  ( δδδ ˆ<< )]}. Substituting 
out ( ) 0>= δηη GR  ( 0< ) and ( ) 0>= δσσ GR  ( 0< ) into Eqs. (5) and (6) gives *** nn = , **1*1 cc =  
for any 1<< δδ  ( δδδ << ) and rr <  { δδ <<0  ( δδδ << ) and rrr <<  [ δδ <<0  
( δδδ ˆ<< ) and rr > ]}. Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
    Let rr <  and 1=δ  hold. Combining either (5) with (11) or (6) with (12) and solving for σ  
gives ( )1GRσσ = . 
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If rrr <= ˆ , then substituting out 0=σ  into Eqs. (5) and (6) gives *** nn = , **1*1 cc =  for any 
w<<∞− η . 
If rr ˆ≠ , then ( ) 10 << δσGR  ( 0< ) if and only rrr <<ˆ  ( rr ˆ< ). Substituting out ( ) 01 >GRσ  ( 0< ) 
into Eqs. (5) and (6) gives *** nn = , **1*1 cc =  for any rrr <<ˆ  ( rr ˆ< ). Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix C 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
 
Assume that the government introduces an intra-generational T/S scheme ( 10 << σ ) in period t  to 
redistribute within the working age (child bearing) generation. Then, the welfare of the current 
(time- t ) elderly is not affected by such a policy. Therefore, the indirect lifetime utility index of the 
time- t  working age generation as well as the welfare levels of the generations born in all 
subsequent periods are exactly the same, i.e., *VVt = . This implies that, for any given value of η , 
the maximisation of *V  with respect to σ  gives the maximum social welfare as well. Therefore, 
assume the government faces the following problem: 
 { } ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ } ( )( )γββσ ηγγσβσ ++−+ −+−++⋅−⋅Η= 11* 1111lnmax rwqV , (C1) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) γβγββγβ ηγβ +++++ −⋅+⋅⋅⋅=Η 1211 1: wrwq , for any η . 
    Differentiating Eq. (C1) with respect to σ  gives: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }ηγγσβσ
σηβγ
σ
σ
−+−++−
+−+
=∂
∂
1111
11*
rwq
rwqV
. (C2) 
• If 0≤η  then ( ) 0* <
∂
∂
σ
σV
 for any 10 << σ . 
• If w<< η0  then 
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( ) ** 0 σσ
σ
σ
>
<
⇔
<
>
∂
∂V
, (C3) 
with *σσ =  (see Eq. 18 in the main text) being an interior global maximum. Since ( )σ*V  is a 
positive (negative) monotonic function of σ  for any *0 σσ <<  ( 1* << σσ ) and 
( ) −∞=→ σσ *1lim V , then there always exists a threshold value *ˆ σσ >  such that ( ) ( )0ˆ ** VV =σ  for 
any w<< η0 . Hence, ( ) ( )0** VV >σ  ( ( ) ( )0** VV <σ ) for any σσ ˆ0 <<  ( 1ˆ << σσ ). Q.E.D. 
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